Third Party Service Provider
We are seeing a possible error or delay in message propagation within our Support Chat Systems, caused by a third party service provider issue. The provider has shared information on their status page.
Our ability to provide support through support@fastly.com is unaffected by this incident, if you are experiencing delayed responses in your dedicated support chat channel, please switch to email methods to ensure prompt response by our support team. Network and Security products remain unaffected by this third party provider event, and services continue to be delivered to our customers.
We will continue to monitor the providers status page and report once Support Chat Systems are no longer at risk of impact.
We are seeing a possible error or delay in message propagation within our Support Chat Systems, caused by a third party service provider issue. The provider has shared information on their status page.
Our ability to provide support through support@fastly.com is unaffected by this incident, if you are experiencing delayed responses in your dedicated support chat channel, please switch to email methods to ensure prompt response by our support team. Network and Security products remain unaffected by this third party provider event, and services continue to be delivered to our customers.
We will continue to monitor the providers status page and report once Support Chat Systems are no longer at risk of impact.
Our third party service provider has confirmed that mitigations have been deployed and they are monitoring for any further impact to Support Chat Services.
We will continue to monitor until they have confirmed all services have been fully restored.
Our ability to deliver all other services remains unaffected by the third party providers incident.
The Fastly status page https://fastlystatus.com is currently unavailable. Our vendor has advised that the issue is related to an ongoing incident with Azure Portal and they are working to fully restore https://fastlystatus.com . As a temporary workaround our vendor has shifted our status page to https://fastly.status.page .
All other Fastly services are unaffected by this event.
Fastly Engineering has identified a performance impact with issuing TLS certificates through one of our third-party service providers that is currently experiencing an outage.
Customers may experience a failure obtaining a TLS certificate as a result of this outage. Customers who need assistance with obtaining a TLS certificate can engage with our Support team through https://support.fastly.com . We apologize for this inconvenience and remain readily available to resolve any impact experienced as a result of this event.
Our Engineering team has confirmed an issue with our third-party provider, Globalsign, which is impacting Fastly-managed subscriptions.
As a result, the addition of new domains is currently blocked for both brand new subscriptions and modifications to existing ones.
No other services are impacted.
Our Engineering team has confirmed that our third-party provider, Globalsign, has identified the contributing factor to the issue impacting Fastly-managed subscriptions and are developing a mitigation strategy.
No other services are impacted.
Engineering has confirmed that our third-party provider, Globalsign has resolved the issue that impacted Fastly-managed subscriptions. Domains for new subscriptions and modifying existing ones has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced the inability to obtain new Fastly-managed certificates from 19:50 on the 10th of September 2025 to 16:31 on the 7th of October 2025 UTC.
This incident is resolved.
To offer feedback on our status page, click "Give Feedback"
Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2025-09-10 19:52:36 UTC
Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team.
We're investigating possible performance impact affecting the Support Chat System.
Customers may experience failed support case functions when attempting to generate a support case from Support Chat systems. We ask that customers email Support teams at support@fastly.com to ensure no delays.
We have identified the source of the performance impact to our Support Chat System as an issue with our third-party service provider. We are in active communication with the vendor, and they are working on a resolution.
For the latest updates on their mitigation efforts, please refer to their status page: https://status.ext.foqal.io/statuspage/foqal/1257223
In the meantime, we recommend customers continue to email support@fastly.com for any support needs to ensure there are no delays.
We have confirmed that the performance impact to our Support Chat System that originated with our third-party service provider has been mitigated.
Engineering has confirmed that Support Chat System has been fully restored. Customers may have experienced performance degradation from 12:55 to 18:01 UTC.
For more details regarding the incident with our third-party service provider, please refer to their status page: https://status.ext.foqal.io/statuspage/foqal/1257223
This incident is resolved.
To offer feedback on our status page, click " Give Feedback "
Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2025-08-08 16:40:52 UTC
Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team.
We are seeing increased errors across multiple Fastly services that utilize a common third party service provider, unrelated to Fastly's Edge Cloud Network.
Fastly has launched acute incident response practices to investigate into this issue further in an effort to reduce the impact to our customers.
As our engineers determine the scope of impact our Customer Escalation Management team will be updating the impacted components on this status post.
We're aware of an ongoing Google Cloud incident, detailed on their status page, which is affecting several Fastly services. Customers may be experiencing increased latency due to impact to our KV Store.
Specifically, those trying to access their control plane via manage.fastly.com might notice that several key Observability features are not loading, including Billing, Historical Stats, Log Explorer & Insights, Origin Inspector, Real-Time Log Streaming, and Real-time Analytics. You may also find it difficult to engage with API endpoints. Additionally, customers might see elevated errors when accessing Fastly webpages and documented resources.
Our engineers are working to restore these services as a high priority and we will provide more information shortly.
You can monitor the Google Cloud incident here:
We've confirmed that customers won't receive status post notifications through their Support Slack channels during this incident.
However, we want to assure you that your ability to request a support case through our Support Slack services remains unaffected. You can still open new support cases as needed.
Google Cloud has communicated that they have successfully deployed mitigations to the majority of their services. We are now observing a gradual recovery of Fastly services.
We will continue to monitor this situation with the highest priority until all Fastly and customer services are fully restored.
We have continued to monitor the Google Cloud Status Page for the latest information by the third party service provider.
Incident Update: Full Recovery and Root Cause Identified
Current Status: Resolved
We're confirming that all services impacted during yesterday's incident have fully recovered. Our teams continuously monitored the situation and verified the stability of all affected systems.
Root Cause Analysis
Our investigation has confirmed that the increased errors and latency across our KV Store, control plane, and certain Observability features were a direct result of the Google Cloud disruption on the 12th of June 2025.
Google has publicly shared a post-mortem regarding the incident. It includes specific information about the root cause—an invalid automated quota update to their API management system—along with their mitigation strategies and steps they're taking for future prevention.
Next Steps
For a comprehensive understanding of the incident's origin, mitigation, and Google's preventative measures, we encourage customers to review the official Google Cloud Status Page. This provides a full breakdown from their perspective.
Additionally, our Product and Engineering teams will thoroughly review all Google Cloud Platform (GCP) reports to determine mitigation strategies and ensure they are adopted as part of our long-term preventive measures to ensure our systems are more resilient to third-party outages of this kind in the future.
We appreciate your patience and understanding as we worked through this third-party event. Our focus remains on providing reliable and high-performance services.
We're investigating possible performance impact affecting the Support Chat System related to a vendor reported incident.
- Vendor status page: https://slack-status.com/2025-05/7b32241eb41a54aa
Customers may experience failed support case functions when attempting to generate a support case from Support Chat systems. We ask that customers email Support teams at support@fastly.com to ensure no delays.
This event has been resolved.
To offer feedback on our status page, click "Give Feedback"
Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2025-05-12 22:52:12 UTC
Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team.
We are investigating elevated errors to our Johannesburg (JNB) Point of Presence (POP).
Traffic engineering has been performed in the region to minimize possible impact while we continue to research into this incident.
Our engineers have identified a power outage that caused the impact our engineers observed in our Johannesburg (JNB) POP.
We have contacted a local Third Party Service Provider who has restored power and our engineers have begun to mitigate the POP.
Customers will continue to see their traffic rerouted to surrounding regions until the POP has been fully restored and traffic can be returned to their typical routes. All other products and services remain unaffected by this event.
Engineering has confirmed the impact to our JNB POP has been mitigated.
Our Network Engineering team will gradually return traffic as part of our standard traffic engineering best practices.
This incident has been resolved.
To offer feedback on our status page, click "Give Feedback"
Status Post, Created Date/Time: 2025-05-10 12:52:12 UTC
Note: Our Customer Escalation Management team will update the start date and time of the initial "investigating" status post upon the resolution of this incident. This update is meant to provide our customers and their end users with a potential impact window. The date and time mentioned in the message above indicates when the status post was requested by our Acute Incident Response team.
On the 3rd of May 2025 from 09:00 to 12:00 UTC, a third-party service provider in Vancouver performed maintenance on their services. As a result, Fastly temporarily redirected customer traffic typically served from our Vancouver (YVR) Point of Presence (POP) from neighboring regions.
During this temporary reroute, customers may have experienced intermittent errors and increased latency.
The traffic engineering implemented during the maintenance was reversed once the service provider completed their work, and our Network engineers confirmed that the YVR POP was no longer affected.
Our ability to deliver all other products and services was not affected by this event.
Fastly Engineering has identified a performance impact with issuing TLS certificates through one of our third-party service providers that is currently experiencing an outage.
Customers may experience a failure obtaining a TLS certificate as a result of this outage. Customers who need assistance with obtaining a TLS certificate can engage with our Support team through https://support.fastly.com . We apologize for this inconvenience and remain readily available to resolve any impact experienced as a result of this event.